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BLAME THIS MESSENGER: SUMMERS ON 
FULLER 
Paul A. LeBel* 
LON L. FULLER. By Robert S. Summers. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press. 1984. Pp. xiii, 174. $19.95. 
Publication of the fourth volume in the Jurists: Profiles in Legal 
Theory series, 1 and the first devoted to an American legal philosopher, 
provides an occasion for consideration of more than just the merits or 
deficiencies of this particular work. A comparison of Professor Sum-
mers' addition to the series with the earlier volumes lends itself to re-
flection on the opportunities .and responsibilities of the series' 
contributors, and the comparison may also reveal something about the 
nature of legal philosophy in this country. Ac9ordingly, the plan for 
this review of Summers' tribute (p. vii) to Lon Fuller is first, to indi-
cate the role that the Jurists series can play, second, to suggest some of 
the ways in which the Summers book fails to fill that role, and third, to 
offer a very general critique of the agenda that American legal philoso-
phy has set for itself. 
I 
The historian of philosophy of law confronts at the outset a meth-
odological choice between different principles upon which to structure 
his presentation. A philosopher-centered approach will focus on those 
figures who have made major contributions to jurisprudence, while an 
idea-centered model develops the core jurisprudential concepts along 
broad thematic lines. 2 Each of the options carries with it certain risks. 
The former approach, often chronologically ordered, can all too easily 
lapse into a tedious account of the "and then, after Aquinas died ... " 
variety. As the parade of philosophers passes before the reader, the 
impact of the most significant thinkers can be blunted, and the percep-
tion of conceptual unity and clarity can be impeded. The idea-centered 
• Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and 
Mary. A.B. 1971, George Washington University; J.D. 1977, University of Florida. - Ed. 
I. The previous volumes were A. KRONMAN, MAx WEBER (1983), N. MAcCoRMICK, 
H.L.A. HART (1981), and W. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN (1982). 
2. Books ofreadings for law school jurisprudence courses are often susceptible to C?tegoriza-
tion along these lines. For an example of a book that primarily takes the philosopher-centered 
approach, see G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE: TuxT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW (1973). F. CoHEN & M. CoHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSO-
PHY (P. Sbuchman ed. 1979), is predominantly an idea-centered anthology, as is LoRD LLOYD 
OF HAMPSTEAD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1979) . 
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approach, on the other hand, can misleadingly convey jurisprudential 
ideas as full-blown entities at the expense of an understanding or ap-
preciation of incremental developments in the process of "doing" ju-
risprudence, i.e., of thinking about the nature of law.3 
In structuring each of the early volumes of the series around a 
single figure,4 Jurists offers a promising alternative to the superficial 
surveys that are currently available. There are, however, a number of 
questions that need to be addressed if the series is to achieve its full 
potential as the most important contemporary secondary source on 
jurisprudence readily accessible to the nonspecialist reader. In this 
section of the review, I will identify some of the questions that appear 
not to have been satisfactorily resolved to date, including: what is the 
audience for the series, what is the mission of the individual volumes, 
and how should the match between subject and author be made. While 
I offer tentative suggestions about the lines along which answers could 
be developed, more comprehensive responses must await the attention 
of those scholars with a deeper and wider background in the field. 
What is the audience of the series? 
The choice of the subjects and authors for individual volumes and 
the substance of the individual volumes necessarily depend on the un-
derlying conception of the audience to which the series is addressed. 
In suggesting that the volumes "are intended as reflective essays rather 
than as comprehensive monographs," Professor Twining, the general 
editor of the series, may be trying to reach the reader with some so-
phistication in the field while still offering the neophyte a "short, au-
thoritative, reflective introduction[ ]."5 However admirable the goal 
of providing something for everyone, either the series as a whole or 
particular volumes could fall into the gap between those two potential 
readerships. 
The series got off to an impressive start, and set a correspondingly 
high standard for future volumes, with the MacCormick study of 
H.L.A. Hart.6 One may wonder how a study of the philosopher who 
rescued legal positivism from the immature perspective of the impera-
tive theorists such as John Austin and from the internal inconsisten-
cies of Hans Kelsen could go astray, but I suspect that MacCormick's 
3. The standard texts for student use attempt to incorporate both approaches, but run a 
considerable risk of doing neither very well. See, e.g., E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE 
PHILOSOPHY AND Mr.moo OF rnE LAW (rev. ed. 1974); E. PATIERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: 
MEN AND IDEAS OF rnE LAW (1953). 
4. Later volumes may not be structured in this way. In his General Preface to the series, 
Professor Twining stated: ''The conception of the series is sufficiently broad to include studies of 
groups of thinkers and even of single works." Twining, General Preface, in N. MAcCORMICK, 
H.L.A. HART (1981). 
5. Id. 
6. See N. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 1. 
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work has something in common with the play of the greatest athletes: 
they make the difficult look easy, and thus may create the risk of being 
under-appreciated. To a presentation of Hart's major themes that is 
both lucid and faithful to the original, MacCormick has added a suc-
cinct and cogent appraisal as well as an extension of some of Hart's 
major ideas. 7 The student beginning the study of jurisprudence could 
use the MacCormick volume to test his or her own understanding of 
Hart, while the reader with a more fully developed critical attitude 
toward Hart can easily benefit from an exposure to MacCormick's 
insights. 
The next two volumes in the series played a somewhat different 
role. MacCormick's reflections on Hart were a valuable complement 
to the original work, but the ultimate force of the volume was 
centrifugal, pushing the reader outward toward study of the works of 
Hart. The Morison and Kronman volumes have more of a centripetal 
force, and can be viewed more as substitutes for, rather than comple-
ments to, direct study of the original work of their subjects. The pri-
mary work of both Austin and Weber is, I suspect, too often either 
read in abbreviated excerpts or ignored entirely in the basic jurispru-
dence course. 8 Lengthy exposure to Austin's major work9 is undoubt-
edly deterred by what Lon Fuller has described as "what may well be 
the dreariest prose ever penned by man."10 Weber is not sufficiently a 
philosopher oflaw qua law, and his theory oflaw is either so scattered 
across the range of his work or so buried in the "dense prose" of the 
Sociology of Law, 11 that the reader without a broad base in philosophy 
and sociology may be reluctant to venture onto what appears to be 
treacherous ground. Although not wishing to be cast in the role of 
encouraging reliance on secondary works as a substitute for careful 
scrutiny of the original work of important scholars, I suspect that each 
of these volumes, albeit in different ways, interjects into the basic 
study of jurisprudence a more rigorous explication of these scholars' 
contributions than their work might receive on its own. 
7. In so doing, MacCormick has made accessible to a wider audience the significant scholar-
ship contained in his earlier work, LEGAL REAsoNING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978). 
8. Of the works cited at note 2 supra, the Cohen and Cohen book has a 20-page excerpt from 
Austin, F. CoHEN & M. CoHEN, supra note 2, at 8-28, but nothing from Weber. Lloyd includes 
17 pages from Austin, LoRD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD, supra note 2, at 19-21 & 223-37, and none 
from Weber, although Weber is given a brief textual discussion. Id. at 350-51. In keeping with 
his practice of providing the student with lengthy excerpts from the philosophers who are in-
cluded in his book, Christie provides over 120 pages excerpted from Austin, G. CHR!sTIE, supra 
note 2, at 471-594, but nothing from Weber. 
9. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1954). 
10. L. FuLLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 103 (temp. ed. 1949). 
11. See A. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 1. 
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. What is the goal of the individual volume? 
These remarks on the earlier volumes in the Jurists series indicate 
that the purpose of the individual volumes is dependent upon, and 
should vary according to, the extent to which the original work of the 
subject is (a) inaccessible and (b) likely to require such an interdiscipli-
nary background as to present a forbidding facade to the uninitiated 
reader. When the barriers appear to be formidable, the authors of Ju-
rist volumes have an opportunity to carve out handholds that facilitate 
surmounting the barriers, thus opening up intellectual terrain that 
might otherwise go unexplored. By adding to the richness and variety 
of the encounter with jurisprudential matters, series volumes that 
widen the scope of the reader's exposure serve a valuable purpose. 12 
Authors of series volumes about writers such as Fuller, whose 
work is readily available to contemporary audiences and is written in a 
manner that invites rather than deters comprehension (p. 15), are in 
large measure relieved of the path-breaking tasks imposed on authors 
who address the more obscure, if not obscurantist, works of legal phi-
losophers. Although path-breaking may not be a necessary function 
when- writing about the more accessible figures, indicating a route 
through a body of work may still be an important contribution to a 
wider and deeper understanding of the work, particularly when it cov-
ers a broad spectrum of topics. 
Certain general responsibilities are inherent in writing for an audi-
ence composed in part of readers who may be using a volume in this 
series to guide ~m initial exploration of the work of a legal philosopher. 
Professor Twining has noted his request that contributors "set their 
subjects in the context of their times and specific concerns," and "be 
scrupulously fair in interpretation but not . . . inhibited in expressing 
their own opinions."13 Both backward- and forward-looking evalua-
tion may be beyond the capability of the reader drawing initially on 
his or her own resources. Identification of the intellectual currents out 
of which the subject's work emerged, and from which it diverged, is a 
service the author needs to provide, along with a demonstration of 
how the work has affected, or is likely to affect, the future course of 
developments. 
What qualities should be sought in the authors? 
The tasks described in the preceding section call for a variety of 
skills. The sine qua non is, of course, a thorough mastery of the work 
of the subject of the volume. Without a firm grasp of the full oeuvre of 
12. The goal of expanding the range of tools with which the reader thinks about law and 
legal problems suggests that as the series includes volumes that are not philosopher-centered, a 
promising line to pursue would be some of the "law and .•• " subjects, chief among them being 
law and economics. 
13. See Twining, supra note 4. 
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the subject, 14 the author of even these short reflective introductions15 
will be unable to appreciate how the diverse strands of the work might 
form a pattern that will make it easier to assess the significance of the 
subject's thought. 
Nearly as important as an understanding of the work of the subject 
is a familiarity with the milieu in which the work took place. An au-
thor would be seriously handicapped in trying to explain Hart without 
at least a basic appreciation of the linguistic and analytical philosophy 
being done at Oxford, 16 or in attempting to assess Austin's significance 
without locating his work within the utilitarian circle that influenced 
and supported that work.17 
This series demands more than just reporting or paraphrasing if it 
is to achieve its full potential. The authors must-bring to bear on their 
subjects an independent intelligence that Professor Twining describes 
as "sympathetically critical."18 Synthesizing· various themes, rerout-
ing lines of argument around pitfalls, carrying an argument through 
the next stages of development - these tasks require that the authors 
be substantial scholars in their own right. 
II 
Measured against the level of performance of the first three 
volumes in the series, or evaluated in terms of the questions raised in 
the preceding section of this review, Professor Summers' contribution 
is a seriously flawed work that will not enhance the reputation of the 
Jurists series. Perhaps the most striking feature of the volume is the 
choice of Summers as the author of a volume on Fuller. For at least 
two major reasons, Summers would not appear to be an obvious candi-
date for the role. First, as Summers himself acknowledges at the out-
set of the book (p. vii), a sympathetic account of Fuller's work marks a 
departure from his earlier treatment of Fuller. 19 Second, Summers' 
14. Writing about living legal philosophers presents obvious difficulties that are not present 
when the body of work is closed, but it may present opportunities as well. An active scholar may 
become so focused on details that not only does the forest disappear, but the recognition of the 
trees as well might be prevented because of an inability to see anything but individual leaves. An 
objective evaluation of one's work to date has the potential of providing an illuminating perspec-
tive that the scholar might not otherwise receive from critiques that are as much directed at the 
details as is the work being evaluated. 
15. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. 
16. See N. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 1, at 12-19. 
17. See W. MORISON, supra note 1, at 38-60. 
18. See Twining, supra note 4. 
19. Compare Summers, Professor Fuller on Morality and Law, 18 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1 (1965), 
reprinted in R. SUMMERS, MORE EssAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: GENERAL AssESSMENTS OF 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 101 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Summers, Morality], with Summers, Pro-
fessor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HARV. L. REv. 433 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Summers, Dominant Philosophy]. 
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views of American legal philosophy20 are sufficiently idiosyncratic that 
one might view with some suspicion his selection as a contributor to a 
series such as Jurists. Neither one of these points necessarily disquali-
fies Summers from contributing a volume on Fuller to the Jurists se-
ries. Nor do I mean to suggest that there is not a good deal that is of 
value in this book. However, a consideration of these two points 
reveals, and perhaps explains, a number of the major flaws in Lon L. 
Fuller. 
As noted before,21 Professor Twining has asked contributors "to be 
sympathetically critical" of their subjects. Summers refers to his ac-
count as "decidedly sympathetic,"22 and describes a rereading of the 
entire body of Fuller's work (apparently as part of the preparation of 
his Instrumenta/ism treatise)23 as provoking a heightened regard for 
Fuller's contribution to legal theory (p. vii). In theory, at least, this 
process of undergoing a growing appreciation for the work of the sub-
ject offers an opportunity for the reader of this book to experience 
second-hand the observations and insights that raised Fuller's stature 
in the eyes of the author. But such a process holds out that opportu-
nity only at the price of creating a pair of risks that Summers is not 
always able to avoid. 
The first and more serious risk is that the author who, over time, 
comes to a conclusion different from one he had held at an earlier date 
will overreact to the change in position. The critic converted to sup-
porter may assume the mantle of the hagiographer. While Summers 
usually keeps his enthusiasm under restraint,24 there are instances of 
gushing overstatement that raise at least some warning signs about 
Summers' ability to present an objective appraisal of his subject. In 
his concluding chapter, Summers refers to Fuller as "the greatest 
proceduralist in the history of legal theory" (p. 151). While philoso-
phy of law does not seem to me to be an activity that lends itself to the 
kinds of comparisons more appropriately made about left-handed 
pitchers, one who makes statements of this sort at least ought to recog-
nize how the evaluation is undercut by other statements he has made. 
For example, Summers earlier states: 
Fuller did not develop a systematic account of the purposes that are es-
sential to the definition of each basic process. Nor did he explain very 
fully how far a necessary purpose may fail of embodiment or implemen-
tation before we can say the process no longer exists, or has become 
20. See R. SUMMERS, INSfRUMENTALlSM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982). 
21. See notes 13, 18 supra. 
22. P. vii (emphasis added). 
23. See note 20 supra. 
24. Summers qualifies many of his assessments of Fuller. Fuller is described, for example, as 
''[i]n his time • • . the leading standard·bearer of secular 'natural law' theory in the English· 
speaking world." P. 1 (emphasis added). 
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some other kind of process. But he did offer many remarks on the pur-
poses of different processes .... [Pp. 31-32.] 
There is quite a gap between offering "remarks" on process and being 
the greatest proceduralist in history, and in chapters devoted to 
Fuller's work on legal processes, Summers simply fails to sustain 
Fuller in the exalted position to which the concluding chapter elevates 
him. 
The other risk that is presented in an account by a convert is that 
the process of conversion can be glossed over, with the new under-
standing or appreciation presented as a fait accompll I suspect that 
the reader would have benefited from a more thorough explanation of 
what deficiencies the author had previously identified in Fuller's work, 
and precisely how the rereading changed or corrected the earlier 
views, or made the earlier objections less significant. 
In an earlier appraisal of the first edition of Fuller's The Morality 
of Law, 25 Summers concluded that Fuller had failed to establish that a 
set of legality principles had to be characterized as moral principles.26 
That criticism, if well supported, should strike at the heart of Fuller's 
development of "the inner morality of law."27 In this book, Summers 
apparently has come around to the view that Fuller's purported mo-
rality is a morality (pp. 33-41), but Summers' method of arriving at 
that conclusion is not a service to Fuller or to the reader trying to 
grasp the significance of the morality designation. 
Summers first collapses the idea ~hat legality principles can consti-
tute a morality into the idea that the legality principles "necessarily 
translate into principles or values of moral worth" (p. 37). Then, 
while acknowledging that the move is his rather than Fuller's, Sum-
mers identifies the citizen's ''fair opportunity to obey the law"28 as the 
moral value that is secured by compliance with Fuller's principles of 
legality. Summers attempts to reinforce this argument from fairness 
with an argument from legitimacy. If a "lawgiver violates the princi-
ples oflegality, . . . the lawgiver . . . necessarily forfeits some govern-
mental legitimacy. . . . Legitimacy is itself a moral value" (p. 38). 
Left unstated is the basis on which the values Summers identifies as-
sume the guise of moral values. 
The arbitrariness of Summers' bridging of the gap between legal 
principles and moral principles is demonstrated by his consideration of 
a criticism that was directed at Fuller's principles. Summers cites an 
exchange between Fuller and Wolfgang Friedmann in which Fuller 
resists Friedmann's characterization of Fuller's principles as " 'mere 
25. L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969) (1st ed. 1964). 
26. Summers, Morality, supra note 19, at 127-30. 
27. L. Fuller, supra note 25, at 42. 
28. P. 37 (emphasis in original). 
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conditions of efficacy' " (p. 37). Yet Summers himself had earlier 
written: 
A further reason for refusing to apply the halo word "morality" to the 
author's principles of legality is that there is an apposite alternative: 
They may be viewed as "maxims of legal efficacy" and maxims of this 
nature are not, as such, conceptually connected with morality. If a per-
son assembles a machine inefficiently, the result is inefficiency, not 
immorality.29 
If Summers' facile equation of the fairness of an opportunity to obey 
the law and governmental legitimacy with morality is sufficient to turn 
Fuller's principles into a morality oflaw, then the obvious step to have 
taken would have been to state simply that inefficiency is immoral. 
Labelling something moral is no more persuasive when done at one 
remove, as Summers does, than when done directly, as Fuller did. 
Summers recognizes in passing that the notion of "what ought to be" 
is a notion "of some appropriate person or body" (p. 34), but the stan-
dard of appropriateness is not provided. Furthermore, recognizing 
that "legal standards of content are frequently moral in character" (p. 
35) tells us nothing about which standards have that quality. Sum-
mers' hypothesis that a necessary connection between validity and mo-
rality exists "[w]henever a rule, to qualify as valid law, must satisfy 
tests of moral worth specified in standards of legal validity" (p. 35) 
displays the twin failings of his attempt to protect natural law theory 
from inanity: the ignoring of the necessity of human agency in the 
formulation of a standard of validity that includes tests of moral 
worth, and the overloading of the definable concept of legal validity 
with indefinite notions of morals. 
The danger that is associated with this moral overloading of valid-
ity is inadvertently displayed by Summers' attempt to extend the ne-
cessity of moral value to legal processes. Summers refers to "genuine 
legislative processes of a democratic kind" as apparently including a 
"right of parties potentially affected by a proposed law to a legislative 
hearing in which they may try to influence the content of the legisla-
tion" (pp. 40-41). For at least seventy years, no such "right" has been 
recognized in this country.30 The question that is necessarily posed to 
those who would infuse morality into validity concepts is whether the 
legislative process in this country is thereby rendered immoral and/ or 
invalid. Summers' designation of the moral values that are secured by 
the principles of legality is of little help in answering this question. A 
hearing right has no effect on a ''fair opportunity to obey the law,"31 
but such a right arguably could be part of the contractarian "under-
standing" that gives a government legitimacy (pp. 38, 84). 
29. Summers, Morality, supra note 19, at 129. 
30. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
31. P. 37 (emphasis in original). 
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Summers' view raises a number of questions. What makes an op-
portunity to be heard by a legislature a right? Is it a right because a 
hearing would be moral? I suspect that we would be better off if we 
followed Fuller's lead and identified this procedural step as something 
that ought to be provided. In that way, the proponent of a legislative 
hearing would be able to make the instrumental arguments for the 
desirability of a hearing, and those arguments could be evaluated on 
their merits, without the distraction (and the potential failure) of a 
leap from the undesirability to the immorality of proceeding without a 
legislative hearing. 
Even if we were to accept Summers' implicit conclusion that a leg-
islative process that did not afford a hearing to affected parties is in 
some sense immoral, the consequences of that conclusion are not at all 
clear. Are the enactments of that legislative process invalid, immoral, 
or both? If the members of the legislative body in fact consider all the 
matters that would have been raised in legislative hearings, isn't the 
hearing directed at another goal, namely, the inclusion of the citizenry 
in the process of legislating? Are we then in the position of having to 
add yet another statement to Summers' list of what is moral (e.g., "le-
gitimacy" (p. 38)) and immoral (e.g., "injustice" (p. 37)), to the effect 
that inclusion is a moral value? 
Both Fuller and the reader would be better served by an introduc-
tory essay that is able to convey a deeper understanding of precisely 
what Fuller was trying to do and why it was important. In overcom-
ing his earlier objections to Fuller in the way that he displays in this 
book, Summers proves to be unable to save Fuller from the force of 
those and other objections in any meaningful way. 
The criticisms of the book that center around Summers' blossom-
ing enthusiasm for Fuller as a pivotal figure in jurisprudence provide 
only part of the reason why Summers seems not to have been the ideal 
choice to contribute a volume on Fuller to the Jurists series. A differ-
ent set of criticisms, derived from Summers' attempts to develop a uni-
fied view of American legal theory, raises equally serious questions 
about the Summers book. 
During the course of the past decade, Professor Summers has de-
veloped at considerable length, 32 and with no small degree of sophisti-
cation, his hypothesis that the work of many prominent American 
legal theorists of the first half of this century33 reflects a sort of 
prototheory of law which he labels "pragmatic instrumentalism."34 
32. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 20. 
33. See id. at 22-26. 
34. I do not understand Summers to be suggesting that a fully developed theory of law can be 
found in the work of those theorists he identifies as pragmatic instrumentalists. Indeed, such a 
suggestion would fly in the face of such disclaimers as that issued by Llewellyn, Some Realism 
about Realism - Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222 (1931). What Summers 
appears instead to be doing is identifying certain concerns common to this set of theorists, and 
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His fresh perspective on a group of scholars who have usually been 
categorized as the American legal realists is bound to produce both a 
renewed interest in this group of theorists and a heightened awareness 
of the need to explore the responsibilities and consequences of operat-
ing at the level of metatheory.35 However one might agree or disagree 
with Summers' work on pragmatic instrumentalism, jurisprudence as 
a whole should benefit from his efforts. 
When Summers turns from his pet theory to the work of someone 
who by all reasonable reckoning was outside of the movement, a po-
tential trap is set for the reader who is unaware of the peculiar per-
spective from which Summers views American legal theory. In his 
1978 essay on Fuller and the pragmatic instrumentalists, Summers 
noted the desirability of accommodating Fuller's views within that 
theory oflaw.36 Four years later, Summers described Fuller as a ma-
jor critic of American pragmatic instrumentalism.37 Now, in a book 
purporting to be about Fuller, Summers states that "Fuller stood . . . 
on the side of the instrumentalists," but he simply "did not belong to 
the realist wing of American pragmatic instrumentalism" (p. 4). The 
reader who is attempting to obtain an understanding of Fuller must 
consider the possibility that Fuller's views have undergone at least 
some distortion in order to enable Summers to bring Fuller into a non-
realist "wing of American pragmatic instrumentalism."38 Without 
further warning or background, the reader is unable to separate what 
is uniquely Summers' from a more mainstream depiction of the legal 
and philosophical environment in which Fuller participated and 
against which he reacted. 39 
then developing on his own "something that qualifies as a general theory." R. SUMMERS, supra 
note 20, at 11 (emphasis in original). 
35. Compare Moore, The Need for a Theory of Legal Theories: Assessing Pragmatic Instru· 
mentalism, 69 CoRNELL L. REv. 988 (1984), with Summers, On Identifying and Reconstructing a 
General Legal Theory- Some Thoughts Prompted by Professor Moore's Critique, 69 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1014 (1984). 
36. See Summers, Dominant Philosophy, supra note 19, at 433. 
37. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 38. 
38. Even if the change has occurred in Summers' conception of his theory, if all he is doing is 
conflating instrumentalism with antiformalism, Summers achieves the integration of Fuller into 
the instrumentalist camp only at the debasement of the theory. Ironically, this is a risk that 
Summers appears to have recognized in 1978. See Summers, Dominant Philosophy, supra note 
19, at 433. Fuller can be classified as an instrumentalist, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 4 (1977), but even that term begins to lose its significance if it begins to be used so 
that it encompasses anyone who thinks law has a purpose. 
39. I do not mean to suggest that Summers should be precluded from offering his own in-
sights into Fuller's work, particularly insights that reflect Summers' development of the prag-
matic instrumentalist theory. Both MacCormick and Morison provide good illustrations of how 
carefully developed original insights can add to the depth and sophistication of the reader's un-
derstanding of the subject. See, e.g., N. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 1, at 96-102, 111-20; W. 
MORISON, supra note 1, at 178-205. What is essential for an introductory treatment of the sort 
proper for a volume in this series is a demarcation of the line between the views of the subject and 
the views of the author that is discernible by the reader who lacks a familiarity with the works of 
both. 
February 1985] Summers on Fuller 727 
The most serious (and the most inexcusable) shortcoming of Sum-
mers' book lies in his description of the major legal theory which 
Fuller opposed and as an alternative to which he offered his version of 
a natural law theory. No account of Fuller that purports to place 
Fuller "in the context of [his] times and specific concerns"40 can avoid 
at least a general description of legal positivism. Indeed, Summers un-
dertakes a description of this view of law even prior to his presentation 
of Fuller's own theory of law, in the belief that "this view as Fuller 
conceived it will help us to understand why this general issue was such 
a live one for him, and why his own theory cannot be dismissed as 
platitudinous" (p. 16). 
However, no book that is likely to find its way into the hands of a 
reader who is relying on the book as part of an initial exposure to 
jurisprudence ought to be permitted to present such a distorted view of 
legal positivism as Summers provides here. Even when the distortion 
is Fuller's, 41 one of the responsibilities of the author of an introductory 
text such as this is to correct the misperceptions of the terms of the 
dispute created by the subject's misstatements and oversimplifications 
of the opposing view. Otherwise, Fuller's theory would need to be 
rescued not from dismissal as "platitudinous" but rather from the 
charge that the theory is a trivial response to a positivist straw-man 
with no realistic counterpart in contemporary legal thought. 
At the heart of Summers' distortion of legal positivism is an inex-
plicable failure to comprehend the meaning that positivists attach to 
the term "validity." Summers argues that a "source-based" test of 
validity fails to capture the extent to which content is actually relevant 
to the validity of "a lower-tier precept" (p. 44). As evidence of this 
failure, Summers describes the apparent conflict between the source-
based validity and the content-based validity of an unconscionable 
contract, a will that conflicts with state governmental policy, an arbi-
trarily discriminatory statute, and a judicial precedent that is not 
"good law" (p. 45). Setting aside for the moment the last example, 
which is subject to its own peculiar difficulties, 42 each of the so-called 
40. See text at note 13 supra. 
41. In his initial description, Summers states that he is presenting a look at positivism "as 
Fuller conceived it." P. 16. In his later, more fully developed treatment, Summers attributes to 
Fuller the thesis that "the positivist quest for a general criterion by which the law could be 
identified and differentiated must fail," and states that because "Fuller did not develop the [the-
sis] as fully as he might have," Summers will attempt "to elaborate it here faithfully to his evi-
dent intuitions (and also in a manner largely consistent with the anti-positivism of Dworkin)." 
P. 42. 
42. The meaning Summers assigns to the phrase "good law" displays some of the difficulties 
of his attempt to portray the theory of judicial decisionmaking in a negative, antipositivist mold. 
Earlier in the book, Summers appears to be including the test of "a precedent for minimal 'good-
ness' ('Is that good law?')" within those content standards which are based on morality. P. 35. 
There and at this point in the book, Summers seems merely to be misusing the term "good law" 
as a synonym for binding precedent that provides the solution to the dispute before the court. 
However, Summers shortly thereafter makes it clear that the apparent confusion is in fact delib-
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content-oriented tests of legal validity is itself dependent on what a 
positivist would have no difficulty describing as a source-based legally 
valid rule. Contracts are unenforceable because of a legal rule of un-
conscionability,43 wills violate state governmental policy embodied in 
properly enacted statutes,44 and statutes are set aside as discriminatory 
under a federal or state constitutional provision.45 Summers fails to 
distinguish between the validity of rules, which positivists purport to 
be able to determine on a source-based standard, and the validity of 
public and private acts, which must of course include reference to con-
tent-oriented standards, but to such standards as are found in or infer-
able from legally valid rules. 
The more significant conceptual and practical questions tum on 
the issue of how legal decisionmakers can and should select the con-
tent for specific rules and decisions. Presenting this issue as part of an 
anti positivist agenda (pp. 54-57) entangles the reader in a law /moral-
ity dichotomy that need not be part of either the positivist or the natu-
ral law program. Summers describes the impossibility of 
differentiating legal argumentation from moral argumentation (p. 55). 
A differentiation can, of course, be made, but the questions become 
why one would want to make the differentiation, and what one has 
sought to prove by the distinction. 
The distinction I would draw is based on use rather than content. 
Legal argumentation consists of reasoning offered to affect a decision 
by a legal decisionmaker. Within such argumentation, reasons derived 
from various sources will have room to operate depending on the par-
ticular hierarchy of persuasiveness that has been established within the 
system. If the reason for distinguishing legal from moral argumenta-
tion is to suggest that positivists ignore the latter, the suggestion is 
absurd. It is true, however, that within the sphere of legal argumenta-
tion, reasons will have different weights, and decisionmakers will have 
varying degrees of freedom to follow certain reasons. Without an un-
derstanding of the hierarchical structure of rules within a legal system, 
both the observer and the participant will be totally unequipped to 
erate, that "the standard of sufficient goodness is largely determined by moral notions," and that 
the legal validity of a precedent depends on its becoming "settled" by passing a test that is based 
in part on "general moral ideas of sufficient goodness 'outside the law' on which such standards 
must continuously draw." P. 55. This exercise might have some point if Summers were ap· 
preaching the issue that contemporary legal philosophers have joined under the headings of the 
meaning of judicial discretion and whether legal questions always have right answers. See, e.g., 
R. DWORKIN, supra note 38, at 31-39, 81-130; Dworkin, No Right Answer?, in LAW, MORALITY, 
AND SOCIETY: EssAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 58-84 (P. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977). 
Summers indicates, however, that this is not Fuller's primary concern, p. 51, and thus the pur-
pose seems to be simply to offer a further attack on the positivist straw-man whose theory oflegal 
validity is unconcerned with content. P. 54. 
43. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (1972). 
44. See, e.g., T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 135-38 (2d ed. 1953) (dis-
cussing the policy underlying statutes setting restrictions on charitable and religious devices). 
45. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-1146 (1978). 
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understand to whom arguments should be addressed and along what 
lines they should be structured in order to be most effective. 
Summers' attempt to use the experience of the common law as 
proof of the failure of the positivist quest involves him in a convoluted 
tangle of uses of the word "law" that might well be better abandoned 
than sorted out. The steps in the argument (p. 50) are essentially 
these: (1) Common-law rules owe their status as law to "general ac-
ceptance and rational appeal," rather than to their "having been laid 
down by prior judges;" (2) common-law rules are "sufficiently good to 
become 'settled' law and therefore truly law" when their rational ap-
peal "to subsequent judges and to the legal profession at large" gives 
them a certain level of acceptance;46 (3) common-law rules have the 
status of law even before a judicial decision because (and here Sum-
mers must be quoted lest the reviewer be accused of intentionally par-
odying his views) 
in my view, the grounds on which interpretational notions, custom, and 
common law are received are very largely generalizable, are in fact so 
generalized, and are widely understood within at least the legal profes-
sion. Thus for the law to be knowable in advance, it is simply not neces-
sary to have the kind of system for which so many positivists seem to 
have yearned - a system in which law is identifiable preferably by refer-
ence to the antecedent and authentic stamp of some authoritative origi-
nator. Law can be sufficiently identified by other means.47 
Summers' argument can be tested by taking a fairly common situa-
tion and seeing where the steps of his reasoning lead. Driver A and 
driver B are in a two-car collision, in which B struck A's car from the 
rear, and B wishes to sue A for damages for the personal injuries and 
property damage suffered in the accident. The supreme court of the 
state in which the accident occurred has consistently held to a com-
mon-law rule of contributory negligence. In recent years, nearly two-
thirds of the states have replaced contributory negligence with one of 
three different forms of comparative negligence. The legislature of our 
hypothetical state has considered but not enacted a comparative negli-
gence bill in each of its last three sessions. In such a state of affairs, it 
is difficult to believe that anyone could seriously contend that "the 
law" in this jurisdiction is anything other than the most recent pro-
nouncement to have received the "antecedent and authentic stamp of 
some authoritative originator." If the state supreme court were to de-
cide tomorrow to adopt a system of comparative negligence, would 
that be the law of the state because of its "general acceptance and 
rational appeal"? Would it become "good" or "settled" law only 
when its rational appeal "to the legal profession at large" has pro-
46. This point is developed in a much more sophisticated manner by Ronald Dworkin as a 
matter of tbe "gravitational force" of common law precedents. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 38, 
at 110-23. 
47. P. 50 (emphasis in original). 
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duced an (unspecified) level of acceptance? And before the court an-
nounced the comparative negligence rule, did that rule have the status 
of law because it was "knowable in advance" at least within those seg-
ments of the legal profession which could see it coming? 
Summers sketches a view of law by Gallup poll and horoscope. If 
this be the alternative to positivism, give me positivism! I may thereby 
reveal that I am deluding myself that I am "value-neutral" (p. 52), 
show myself to be a moral skeptic (pp. 52-53), and demonstrate that I 
am unhealthily preoccupied with a theory that does not fit the facts (p. 
53). But I also know how B's case is going to be decided by a trial 
court, to whom B should address arguments for change, and the bind-
ing effect of the change if it should occur. Failure to adopt Summers' 
open-ended view of law does not in any way concede that the role of a 
judge is "simply to do or die and seldom to reason why; his is gener-
ally to be an uncreative role" (p. 60). Yet that creativity takes place 
within limits and subject to constraints. The distorted view of positiv-
ism Summers offers here is a poor substitute for a reasoned exploration 
of the nature and location of those limits, and serves not at all the 
important task of introducing the reader to what is significant in 
Fuller's rejection of positivism. 
III 
The portrayal of Lon Fuller as one of the most influential Ameri-
can legal theorists of this century calls for some concluding thoughts 
on what Fuller's work indicates about the agenda that American legal 
theory addressed during the period of Fuller's work. In order to assess 
the accomplishments of legal theory as represented in Fuller's writing, 
a distinction between the reactive and the positive segments of that 
work will be useful. 
To the extent that Fuller's writing is reacting to what Summers 
sees as a scientific mindset (pp. 53, 57, 63), it displays an essentially 
sterile strain of American legal theory. The late nineteenth-century 
legal science movement in this country was fundamentally different 
from such later developments as Kelsen's pure theory of law. The 
American legal scientists were essentially not concerned with the na-
ture of law as a philosophical or intellectual phenomenon. Rather, 
they were developing a formalistic method of legal decisionmaking 
that would confine the decisionmakers within the parameters of syllo-
gistic reasoning from a major premise that could be located in the rele-
vant statutory or appellate case law. The realists reacted strongly and 
effectively to that concept of decisionmaking. American legal philoso-
phy outside of the "realist wing" (p. 4) makes no significant contribu-
tion if all it does is belabor the same point made by the realists. 
Even the secular natural law which Fuller could have offered as an 
alternative to the more sophisticated positivism of the post-realist era 
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is essentially negative in character. Fuller's inner morality of law en-
ables us to identify putative legal systems that are not what they seem 
to be (p. ·11), but neither the observer nor the participant is otherwise 
given standards against which to measure the validity of particular 
enactments or pronouncements about individual laws. The barrenness 
of Fuller's natural law is most apparent when compared with the crea-
tive work of a natural law proponent such as Ronald Dworkin, ad-
dressing the nature of judicial decisionmaking in light of a 
constructive model for r~ching correct results. 
Fuller's impressive studies of processes are a positive contribution 
to our understanding of the possibilities and the limits of different 
decisionmaking and ordering techniques. Such work, however valua-
ble and illuminating it may be, is only tangentially jurisprudential in 
nature, unless the concept of jurisprudence is so broadened that it in-
cludes all discussion of conflict resolution and resource allocation. 
Fuller's views on custom, for example, undouptedly increase our ap-
preciation of how individuals behave, but to say "that he expanded our 
very concept of law" (p. 78) is to perpetuate the antipositivist di-
lemma, i.e., if we cannot and should not distinguish law from non-law, 
who can object to the proposition that everything is law? 
Summers' over-playing of the antipositivist vein in Fuller's work 
creates a risk that Fuller and the bulk of midcentury American legal 
theory will be dismissed as irrelevant. As long as American legal the-
ory concerns itself excessively with attacks on a legal positivism resem-
bling the simplistic notions of Austin (pp. 48-50), and offers only an 
amorphous and indeterminate "morality" as the reference criterion for 
decisions of difficult and controversial issues (chs. 3-4), the philosophy 
of law generated in this country is likely to lag considerably behind its 
British and Continental counterparts. 
In his earlier text on ~erican legal theory, Professor Summers 
distinguished the fox from the hedgehog, and adopted the stance of the 
hedgehog which knows one great thing or which has the best trick of 
all.48 Considering the fundamentally unsound nature of Summers' in-
troduction of the work of Lon Fuller, I suspect that both the subject 
and the readers of the Jurists series would have been better served had 
the hedgehog stuck to his pragmatic instrumentalist trick. 
48. See R. SUMMERS, supra note 20, at 13. The image is developed with considerable rich-
ness in I. BERLIN, RUSSIAN THINKERS 22-81 (H. Hardy ed. 1978). 
